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



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ECONOMIC SUMMITS AND G7 POLICYMAKING: IMPROVING COMPLIANCE AND CREDIBILITY

Ella Kokotsis and
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March 1998

Economic Summits and G7 Policymaking: Improving Compliance and Credibility
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The paper surveys the compliance of the G7 member states with their summit commitments, presents explanations in variations in compliance by country, issue-area (environment and development, child labour and human rights, nuclear safety and weapons proliferation) and over time. Generally, the increasing level of compliance with Summit commitments can be explained by institutional variables and the role of regimes, and the political control exercised by leaders in accounting for compliance behaviour. The institutional variable is based on long-established departments possessing well-defined domestic implementation responsibilities and also manifesting strong institutional links to powerful multilateral organisations (i.e. Department of Finance versus Department of the Environment). Political control by leaders means that commitments made by Heads of State or Government carry greater weight and will be more likely to be complied with than those by ministers, tempered by approval ratings and popularity with the electorate. While past studies indicate an overall and rising level of Summit compliance in the positive range by Canada and the US with environment and development issues recently and with all issues overall, ultimately, the Summit process requires reform to improve compliance and advance Canada's foreign policy priorities.

Seven general recommendations to improve Summit compliance in ways that support Canadian foreign policy priorities include:
- focus Summit agendas on those issues where the G7 can credibly make a notable difference;
- ministerial meetings of Foreign Ministers should precede and follow G7 Summits;
- domestic issues that have not yet been internationalised should not be considered at G7 Summits and instead should be addressed in the Chairman's Summary;
- focus should be placed on policy initiatives whose means-ends relationships are well understood and accepted;
- commitments should be advanced where individual leaders and the collective heads of state and government hold both formal and real authority, and, consequently, avoid decisions on monetary policy;
- policy dialogue at Summits should embrace those areas where adequate domestic institutional bodies exist to develop and implement domestic policies;
- heads of state and government should meet at the same time ministers meet.

Specifically, the Canadian government should:
- maintain the resources required to monitor implementation initiatives;
- continue to provide annual reports on its own compliance and encourage others to do the same;
- increase awareness of Summit issues;
- privately disseminate information about compliance by their peers;
- mobilise expertise outside of government to encourage feedback and suggestions from other groups on implementation, monitoring and enforcement.

ECONOMIC SUMMITS AND G7 POLICYMAKING: IMPROVING COMPLIANCE AND CREDIBILITY

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Executive Summary

This paper offers a survey study of the compliance of the G7 member states with their Summit commitments, focusing specifically on those issues central to Canada's foreign policy objectives, including the environment, development (debt relief and aid), human rights (child labour), nuclear safety, and weapons proliferation (landmines). Following an empirical assessment of the existing studies on G7 Summit compliance, this paper presents explanations for variations in compliance by country, issue area and over time.

The G7 has continued to produce a large number of specific and ambitious commitments since the Summit's inception in 1975. There have been positive and rising levels of compliance with these commitments. Positive compliance is the result, primarily, of the direct involvement in, and dominance of, the G7 by democratically-elected heads of state and government as well as the effects of important national and international institutional variables. Domestic political factors matter as well, for commitments are complied with when the leaders who made them enjoy credibility as well as popular and party support, have demonstrated a strong tendency towards multilateralism and have shown a strong personal commitment to the G7 as an institution and to the issues themselves. Changes in these factors account for the significant variations in compliance by country, across issue area and over time.

Based on this analysis, this study advances seven general and fourteen practical proposals for reforming the Summit process to improve compliance and thereby enhance Canada's foreign policy priorities. Together, these recommendations point to an enhanced role for foreign ministers and their deputies in acting, on behalf of leaders, to enhance monitoring, surveillance, implementative dialogue, and thus compliance.

Mandate Statement

On August 12, 1997, the University of Toronto G7 Research Group was commissioned by the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development to provide a study on G7 Summit compliance. The project had two central purposes. The first was to examine the compliance records of the G7 member states with their Summit commitments, with particular emphasis on areas central to Canadian foreign policy, including the environment and development, human rights (child labour), nuclear safety and weapons proliferation (landmines). The second purpose was to address why the leaders either do or do not comply with their Summit commitments. Addressing this second question pointed to factors that contribute to compliance as well as to those that explain compliance failure.

These explanations provide a foundation for determining ways in which Canada might use the Birmingham Summit and the G7 Summit process as a whole to improve Summit compliance and thus advance Canada's foreign policy priorities.

To fill this mandate and our objectives, we are pleased to submit the following document in fulfilment of our commitment to the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development.

Economic Summits and G7 Policymaking: Improving Compliance and Credibility

Since 1975, the leaders of the major industrial democracies have met at the annual G7 Summit to address the most pressing international issues of the day, deliberate on shared problems and collectively set directions for the global community. During this process, the G7 has often produced ambitious wide-ranging agreements in an effort to generate a broad multilateral consensus on a diverse number of international economic and political issues. Yet despite the centrality of the G7 and the new interest by international relations theorists on the issue of compliance with international agreements,[1] there has been little effort to analyze and explain G7 Summit compliance, as a foundation for identifying proposals to improve its compliance record. Although there exists a wealth of scholarly and professional writing on the G7, virtually all of it focuses on the first stage of reaching agreements through effective policy coordination. As such, little is known about the extent to which G7 members comply with the commitments they make at their annual Summit meetings. This paper thus addresses the question of compliance with G7 Summit commitments and in so doing, is able to offer proposals for improving the compliance record of the G7 member states.

The first section of this paper details the findings of three separate data sets on G7 Summit compliance, based on studies by von Furstenberg and Daniels, Kokotsis and Kirton, and the University of Toronto G7 Research Group. This section summarizes compliance with Summit commitments both overall and in areas central to Canadian

[1] See, for example, Jacobson, Harold K. and Edith Brown Weiss. "Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a Collaborative Project", in Global Governance, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May-August) 1995: Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (forthcoming); Mitchell, Ronald B. Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994.

foreign policy. The second section of this study offers competing explanations of Summit compliance and identifies those factors that explain why compliance is higher in certain cases than in others. The third and final section offers practical proposals and policy options for Canada and its G7 partners in reforming the Summit process. These are advanced in an effort to improve the overall record of compliance with G7 Summit commitments, in a way that advances Canadian foreign policy priorities and interests. This section offers a broad array of proposals, as a menu from which to select items capable of being advanced at a particular moment in the Summit process; items which reinforce Canada's overall Summit strategy, and those items that could serve as a basis for dialogue and consensus with policy influentials, officials and ministers in other G7 countries.

1. Summary of Findings on G7 Summit Compliance

In order to assess the extent to which the G7 have been successful in implementing their Summit commitments, it is necessary to review the three existing empirical studies on Summit compliance.

The first of these studies, conducted by von Furstenberg and Daniels, examines the compliance record of the G7 from 1975 to 1989, with reference to the G7's economic and energy commitments. The authors' findings suggest that G7 members do comply, albeit weakly at 31% (.307), with their summit commitments (*see Table A).* Moreover, such compliance varies widely by country and issue area, with high compliance coming from Canada and Britain, and in the areas of international trade and energy, and low compliance coming from France and the United States, and in the areas of interest and exchange rate management.[2]

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[2] Von Furstenberg, George and Joseph Daniels, "Policy Undertakings by the Seven Summit Countries:

The second compliance study, conducted by Kokotsis, and Kokotsis and Kirton[3], analyzes the G7's compliance record from 1988-1995 in regard to the G7's environment and development commitments that have flourished during this "post-cold war" period. This study explores the compliance record of the G7's most and least powerful members, the United States and Canada, in an effort to examine the effects on compliance of overall relative capability and to explore the way differences in national institutions affect compliance outcomes. It does so by examining compliance with G7 commitments in four issue areas critical to the global environment and development: climate change; biodiversity; developing country debt; and assistance to Russia. The period from 1988-1995 provides an era of sustained Summit attention to, and important action on these issues, one over which Summit attention and ambition has varied, and one where lags in compliance are visible. This combination of eight years, two countries, and four issue areas including 83 specific commitments offers enough cases to identify compliance patterns and isolate key compliance variables *(see Table B)*.

During this third summit cycle, the G7 produced a large number of specific and often ambitious environment and development commitments - 34 regarding climate change, 15 regarding biodiversity, 13 regarding developing country debt, and 21 regarding assistance to Russia. Canadian and US compliance with these commitments has generally been positive, with an overall combined score of 43%. Yet wide variations appear by country, issue area and over time. Canada's net score of 53% contrasts with the US net score of 34%. Compliance is much higher in regard to assistance to Russia

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Ascertaining the Degree of Compliance", *Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy*, 35, 1991. pp. 267-308.

[3] See, Kokotsis, Ella, *National Compliance with G7 Environment and Development Commitments, 1989-1995,* Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Toronto, January, 1998; Kokotsis, Ella and John Kirton, "National Compliance with Environmental Regimes: the Case of the G7, 1988-1995". Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Ontario, March 18-22, 1997.

(81%) and developing country debt (73%), than for climate change (34%) and above all biodiversity (-13%).

These findings suggest a number of trends with respect to Summit compliance. First, during its third seven-year cycle, the G7 offered a larger number of specific and often ambitious environment and development commitments than was the overall norm for the earlier period. These findings thus suggest that the summit has become more active in generating agreements that are specific, identifiable and measurable, if not necessarily timely, well tailored and ambitious.

Second, Canadian and US compliance during this period has generally been positive, with a net score of 43%[4]. This suggests rising levels of compliance, compared to the von Furstenberg and Daniels figures of 31% for 1975 to 1989. Moreover, this substantial positive compliance during the third cycle is a widespread phenomena; both the most powerful, United States, and relatively less powerful, Canada, have positive compliance records. Positive compliance appears in virtually all eight issue areas (4 issue areas and 2 countries), with the lone exception being biodiversity commitments for the US.

Third, wide variations arise by country. Canada's overall score of 53% contrasts markedly with the US overall score of 34%. While the ranking is consistent with that found by von Furstenberg and Daniels (41% for Canada and 25% for the US), the figures for the third summit cycle suggest a widening of the compliance gap between Canada and the US.[5]

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[4] This pattern contradicts the argument of those who assert that a more limited or focused summit agenda rather than a diffuse or comprehensive one will by itself necessarily produce superior summit performance, as more numerous commitments are accompanied by higher compliance. See, for example, W.R. Smyser, "Goodbye, G7", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 15-28; Bergsten, C. Fred and C. Randall Henning, *Global Economic Leadership and the Group of Seven*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1986.

[5] Note that direct comparisons between the von Furstenberg and Daniels and Kokotsis, Kokotsis and

Fourth, there continues to be wide variation across issue areas. During the third summit cycle, compliance is much higher in regard to assistance for Russia (81%) and developing country debt (73%), than for climate change (34%) and, particularly, biodiversity (-13%).

Finally, there is significant variation over time within the third cycle of summitry for G7 environment commitments. Compliance is lower for both countries in the pre-Rio period of 1988-1991 than in the post-Rio period of 1992-1995. There is a notable peak period of high compliance centred around the Rio year of 1992, which both Canada and the US share.

The final and most recent compliance study, conducted by the University of Toronto G7 Research Group, from the period following the 1996 Lyon Summit to the 1997 Denver Summit of the Eight, found that the overall compliance score by all seven members across the 19 issue areas in the Lyon communique, was 36% *(see Table C)*. Canada's overall compliance score of 47% places Canada second among its G7 partners behind Germany (58%), but ahead of Italy (43%), the US and the UK (42%), France (28%) and Japan (22%). Both Canada and the United States delivered identical compliance scores in the post-Lyon period in those issue areas examined in earlier studies by Kokotsis (environment, development and East/West relations), indicating that relative capabilities do not appear to affect overall compliance outcomes for either the most or least powerful members within the group.

With respect to overall compliance scores - across all 19 issue areas - Canada delivered a score of 47%, compared to 42% for the United States. While these figures show a rank order consistent with earlier studies by both Kokotsis and von Furstenberg

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Kirton studies must be treated with care given that different scales are employed in both studies for measuring compliance, and that this study focuses on Canada and the US only. For an explanation of the scales used in both studies, please see *Appendix A*.

and Daniels, they suggest a strong narrowing of the compliance gap between Canada and the US compared to earlier studies.[6]

In regard to the issue areas examined by Kokotsis from 1989-1995 (environment, development and East/West relations), East/West relations again deliver the highest combined score by Summit members (71%) in the post-Lyon period, followed by environment (43%), and development "0" (indicating a "work in progress" for all Summit members on this issue). Again, these scores are consistent with earlier studies by Kokotsis which found that Summit members comply the most with their commitments to Russia and the Former Soviet Union (ie, East/West relations), compared to environment and development commitments. The post -1996 ranks for development and environment are, however, reversed.

And finally, the 1996 Lyon Summit compliance study broadly confirms the results of the von Furstenberg and Daniels study, but with some notable exceptions. Canada continues to rank high in terms of overall compliance placing second only to Germany. The United Kingdom, receiving the highest compliance score by von Furstenberg and Daniels, drops down to the number four position among its Summit partners. France and Japan continue to perform poorly, ranking sixth and seventh respectively,while the United States rises considerably. The most notable differences between the two studies appear when comparing the results of the overall compliance scores by issue area. Where von Furstenberg and Daniels find that international trade and energy receive the highest scores (73% and 66% respectively), the 1996 Lyon study finds that compliance in these two issue areas has dropped noticeably, with trade delivering a score of 29%

[6] Note that in earlier studies, Kokotsis found that between 1989-1995, Canada's overall compliance score of 53% contrasted markedly with the US overall score of 34%. While the ranking was consistent with that found by von Furstenberg and Daniels (Canada 41%, US 25%), the Kokotsis results indicated a widening of the compliance gap between Canada and the US from 16% in the period 1975-1989, to 19% in the period 1989-1995.

and the environment - the 1990s energy surrogate - 43%.[7] Compliance with macroeconomic commitments in the Lyon study, on the other hand, secure the highest score across Summit members (100%), while corresponding scores in the von Furstenberg and Daniels study find that macroeconomic issues secure an overall combined average score of 27%.[8] Commitments regarding the Middle East and Asia both receive compliance scores in the negative range (-43%), broadly consistent with earlier studies by Kokotsis which found that political commitments stemming from departments of foreign affairs generally secure lower overall compliance scores than those stemming from departments of finance.

2. Patterns and Analysis of Summit Compliance

Given that Summit declarations are not legally binding documents, that no formal enforcement mechanism exists to ensure that implementation systematically occurs, that domestic circumstances and leadership change from year to year, and that some commitments are superseded by subsequent agreements, one might expect the compliance with G7 Summit resolutions would be low. The studies outlined above suggest, however, that over time, the Summit has become more active in generating agreements that are specific, identifiable and measurable, that compliance with Summit commitments has been positive, and that positive compliance is a wide-spread phenomena - in other words, the most powerful US, and least powerful Canada and

[7] Note that environment issues greatly increase in salience during the third cycle of summitry, and are not considered as an issue area in the von Furstenberg and Daniels study. The authors do examine, however, energy commitments during the first two cycles of summitry and conclude that energy commitments secure the second highest level of compliance by the G7, next to international trade commitments. Given that energy resolutions re the logical antecedent in the G7 to environmental commitments, comparisons are drawn in this study between environment and energy commitments".

[8] Note that included in the "macroeconomic" category for von Furstenberg and Daniels is: real GNP growth (40%); demand composition (23%); fiscal adjustments (26%); interest rate (22%); inflation rate (22%). The average of these five categories combined is 27%.

countries in between, comply with their Summit commitments across a wide range of issue areas. Why then, is there a sustained, and in fact, increasing level of compliance with Summit commitments? How does one account for and explain these patterns of Summit compliance?

Based on their empirical findings, Von Furstenberg and Daniels draw conclusions based on three conjectures regarding Summit compliance.

The first conjecture is that joint economic commitments tend to be honoured to a lesser degree than an individual commitment, as collective commitments generate "free-rider" problems. Their findings, however, indicate no statistical difference between these two types of commitments. Hence, compliance with multilateral commitments is no less than with commitments assigned to specific countries.

The second conjecture is that commitments that promise delivery of a policy measure or instrument that is under the direct control of policy makers would be honoured to a higher degree than commitments promising an outcome for a policy target.[9] The scores, however, reveal the opposite. Commitments on direct policy measures receive a lower than average score than those on economic targets. It appears that policymakers have at least as much difficulty adopting policy measures as they do forecasting the impact of policy measures on, and achieving target variables.[10]

Finally, some imagine that policy makers of smaller nations would scrupulously honour their commitments so as to provide political leverage over the policy makers of the larger and more powerful nations. Further, the degree to which one nation can exert

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[9] See, Putnam, Robert D. and C. Randall Henning, "The Bonn Summit of 1978: A Case Study in Coordination", in Richard N. Cooper, Barry Eichengreen, Gerald Holtham, Robert D. Putnam and C. Randall Henning, eds., *Can Nations Agree?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1989, pp. 12-140.

[10] Energy is one functional area that stands apart in the von Furstenberg and Daniels studies, indicating that policymakers may be more successful at microeconomic reforms and crisis management rather than macroeconomic policies.

macroeconomic externalities upon another depends on the relative size of the nations.[11] As a result, large nations would be less likely to honour their commitments.

Although Britain and Canada received the highest scores, and the United States the second lowest, the scores do not reveal any *systematic pattern* based on economic size. Likewise, there is no *significant correlation* of compliance scores with the relative size of the economy, as measured by its GDP. Therefore, the evidence does not support the hypothesized relationship between a country's relative capabilities and its overall compliance score.

The empirical findings by Kokotsis, and Kokotsis and Kirton, indicate, however, considerable support for the explanatory salience of institutional variables, the role of regimes, and the political control exercised by leaders in accounting for compliance behaviour.

A. Institutional Variables and Regimes

Institutional variables and the role of regimes point to explanations regarding Summit compliance. The findings on the debt side and assistance to Russia indicate that there has been a sustained, and in fact high level of Summit compliance by both Canada and the US in these issue areas during the 1989-1995 Summit cycle. This reflects the important national institutional variables at work. Within both of these issue areas, the implementation of Summit resolutions occurs through long-established departments (Treasury and Finance) possessing well-defined domestic implementation responsibilities, but also manifesting strong institutional links to powerful multilateral organizations.

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[11] See, Dobson, Wendy. *Economic Policy Coordination: Requiem or Prologue?* Policy Analyses in International Economics, Vol. 30. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1991.

The domestic implementation of debt and Russian-related commitments can be guaranteed to a high extent, as there is a well-defined and clearly-established process within Treasury and Finance for the domestic implementation of these commitments. Given that finance ministries have the most regularized communication through the G7 finance deputies process, compliance is generally higher with issues stemming from finance ministries, followed by those arising from foreign ministries.[12] This view was confirmed by senior government officials in both Ottawa and Washington who affirmed that "finance ministries have the most well-developed coordination of follow-through, with the foreign ministries next".[13] A senior Canadian government official concurred with this relationship between the role of finance ministries and summit compliance:

> On the economic side, it's easier because the institutional framework already exists. On the political side, there's no mechanism for follow-up, thus the G7 has been less successful in ensuring follow-up on non-economic issues in the past. The G7 finance deputies process ensures some level of follow-up, more so than within foreign ministries.[14]

By contrast, the Department of Environment in Canada and the Environmental Protection Agency in the US are exampies of departments/agencies possessing less of an established process to deal with the implementation of summit resolutions. This is primarily because these agencies/departments have been in existence for a relatively shorter period of time, they are bureaucratically less capable of dealing with the domestic implementation of international commitments and they possess less money in overall budgetary terms and are

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[12] Note that finance ministries control budgets and are thus better able to allocate money to specific issue areas than are foreign ministries. Given that debt and Russian assistance decisions and disbursements stem largely from finance ministries, higher summit compliance would thus result within these issue areas.

[13] Interview with Senior US Government Official, Washington, D.C., March 12, 1997.

[14] Interview with Senior Canadian government official, Toronto, February 12, 1997. Note that whereas G7 finance ministers meet four times a year to specifically discuss G7-related matters, foreign ministers meet only once a year, and only on the margins of the opening session of the United Nations General Assembly.

thus less influential than older, more established great departments of state or central agencies - such as Finance or Treasury. As such, lower compliance is likely with environment commitments than with those arising from departments of Finance and Treasury.

National institutional variables further serve to account for Canada's higher overall record of Summit compliance compared to that of the US. Within Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, a permanent *G7 Summit Coordination Office,* staffed with permanent officers, experienced in the G7, existed to manage, handle, oversee and execute summit undertakings beginning early on in the preparatory process and continuing throughout the year with various implementation initiatives. By contrast, a summit coordination office, or "line office" dealing specifically with G7 undertakings, does not exist at the US State Department, Treasury or the White House. And although directives are sent out to ministries regarding summit undertakings, the thrust to move these initiatives forward often wanes after the summit due to the fact that a central coordinating office does not exist in the US to execute summit resolutions. According to a US government official, "There is no summit coordination office, unlike in Canada, and the energy falls off dramatically post-summit".[15]

International institutional variables of relevance further affect Summit compliance. Departments of Finance and Treasury possess well-established institutional links to long-existing *international* fora, including the Paris Club, IMF and World Bank, which represent the international bodies responsible for the implementation of Russian assistance and debt-related issues. Because the G7 are major shareholders

[15] Interview with Senior US Government Official, Washington, D.C., March 11, 1997.

within these institutions, they are able to set the agenda, prompt action and secure agreements on the implementation of these issues. Furthermore, the G7 Finance Ministers and Finance Deputies fora, which have existed since 1986, allow the G7 to reinforce the national-international institutional link and intensely monitor the implementation of G7 commitments. By contrast, domestic environmental departments lack coordinating centres for G7-related activity and oversight and rely for international implementation on the fragmented specialized agencies of the UN where the G7 members do not possess overwhelming controlling strength due to both institutional characteristics (one-country-one-vote) and underlying issue-specific contributions. An overall lower level of compliance is thus assured in cases where the G7 is less able to exercise political control. In addition, the G7 Finance Ministers and Finance Deputies process has existed since 1986 and is thus more institutionally entrenched than the still-evolving G7 environment ministerial forum created only in 1992. Given that environment ministerials appeared later in the Summit system, compliance is expected to be lower overall with environmental commitments. What should further be noted is that the timing of such ministerials is also relevant to compliance. According to Nicholas Bayne:

> Ministerials which follow fairly soon after the summit are the most helpful in encouraging compliance. The timing of the IMF meetings of finance ministers, three months later, is useful in this regard. Pre-summit ministerials, like those of the environment ministers, can help shape the summit agenda but may not help compliance.[16]

This factor may also account for the very high scores that von Furstenberg and Daniels find in the area of international trade, as the trade ministers Quadrilateral (US, Japan, European Union and Canada), since its 1982 formation, meets three or four times a year. It also implies lower levels of compliance in areas of foreign affairs, where

[16] Interview with Sir Nicholas Bayne, Surrey, England, February 1, 1997.

ministers meet only once a year, five months after the Summit.

An additional *international* institutional variable of relevance is apparent on the environment side of the agenda. The empirical findings suggest that although there is no net compliance during the period 1989-1991 in either climate change or biodiversity, beginning in 1992 and onwards, there is a high level of sustained environmental compliance. The rise in compliance during this period is primarily due to two factors. First, a new era in environmental diplomacy was launched with the convening of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Convening just three weeks later in Munich for their annual Summit meeting, the leaders agreed on the importance of ratifying the climate change and biodiversity conventions, and stressed the salience of implementing the decisions embraced. Thus, as the Earth Summit quickly developed into a nested regime[17], a "Rio effect" is observed corresponding with a higher level of environmental compliance by Canada and the US with the agreements reached at Rio and endorsed in a particular form at the G7 Summit.

The 1991/92 "Rio Rise" also coincided with the institutionalization of the G7 environment ministerials, beginning in Germany just prior to the 1992 Munich Summit, and then continuing in Florence, Italy in 1994, Hamilton, Canada in 1995, Cabourg, France in 1996, and Miami in 1997. These G7 environment ministerials have proceeded to endorse the Rio conventions and have emphasized the importance of their continued implementation.

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[17] The Earth Summit is referred to as a "nested regime" because of the institutional developments that rapidly transpired vis-a-vis the Rio declarations following the conclusion on UNCED in 1992. For example, the UN Commission on Sustainable Development was established in the aftermath of UNCED as the follow-up body for the Rio conventions. Moreover, permanent secretariats were established for both the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions in Bonn and Montreal respectively. Moreover, permanent secretariats were established for both the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions in Bonn and Montreal respectively, with each possessing the institutional underpinnings of a more formal regime: fixed headquarters, a permanent secretariat, budgetary allocations and the creation of binding and enforceable rules.

And finally, there is a third institutional variable of relevance, in this case relating to the expansion of both the *summit's* preparatory and follow-up phases. This expansion has led some officials to conclude that the summit process *itself* has become more institutionalized over the last summit cycle. In turn, this has precipitated an overall rise in compliance by both Canada and the US during the summit's third cycle compared to the previous two. According to a Canadian official:

> There was an inherent reluctance to institutionalize the process, although I think its fair to say that over time, there became more frequent meetings after each Summit, and the meetings to prepare for the next Summit began earlier than before. So it became almost a full-time job and certainly became an annual exercise as opposed to a summer event - not only in the preparatory phases, but also in the stock-taking of what had been achieved.[18]

B. Political Control Exercised by G7 Heads of State and Government

In addition to institutions and regimes, the element of *political control* also offers explanations for compliance with G7 commitments. The representation of leaders themselves at the Summit table seems to ensure that the decisions they reach, and the commitments they make, carry added weight given that there are no higher-level bureaucrats at home to whom their decisions are deferred. As a result, when a head of state or government becomes personally associated with a Summit commitment, compliance is higher than it would be if the commitments would have been arrived at by a group of ministers. As such, when the Prime Minister and President are directly involved and personally engaged, that has a major impact on policy and the priority of policy on the home front. While leaders are equally directly involved at a minimum level on all Summit commitments, and the communique is released in their name,in practice, their degree of personal involvement (in contrast to the preparatory work by their

[18] Interview with Senior Government Official, Montreal, January 31, 1997.

sherpas) varies widely. Only some Summit commitments reflect detailed discussion and even drafting by the leaders at the Summit table. More generally, when the head of state or government attaches a high degree of personal importance and commitment to certain issues, the degree of implementation is even higher.

The political control factor also takes into account the leader's individual personality and the importance he/she places on international institutions and agreements more generally. For example, if a head of state or government demonstrates an attachment to sustainable development initiatives, consistently advances these themes at the annual Summits and elsewhere, and demonstrates a commitment to multilateralism and the G7 process more specifically, compliance levels by their countries will generally tend to be higher.

Yet because G7 heads are not merely leaders, but *democratically-elected* ones, their ability to impose their implementing will within their government is constrained by their political standing within society at large. When leaders and their parties enjoy high approval ratings and popularity, their ability to implement is increased. In addition, when domestic public opinion favours a particular issue area - such as the environment in both Canada and the US - even unpopular leaders at the time, facing a likely electoral defeat (such as Prime Minister Mulroney and President Bush in 1992) will comply with their communique commitments. This is primarily because leaders recognize the effects of public opinion and political pressure in areas important to their electorate.

To summarize, these three studies indicate an overall and rising level of Summit compliance in the positive range by Canada and the US with environment and development issues during the last cycle of summitry from 1988-1995 and by all members, over all issue areas, from 1975 to 1997. These studies find that institutional

variables, coupled with political control variables, best account for Summit compliance during the last cycle of summitry in the environment and development spheres. Slowly changing "structural" factors such as the relative size of the member countries, or factors (such as policy instruments rather than targets) that would suggest a need to lower the ambitiousness of commitments to improve compliance, prove to have little or no effect. There are thus firm empirical foundations to suggest that feasible government policy innovations can improve compliance, and to indicate which innovations will be most productive in this task.

3. Policy Options for Canada and its G7 Partners for Reforming the Summit Process to Improve Compliance

In order for the G7 Summits to provide an environment for effective policymaking, they must establish a credible record, or the expectations placed upon them and the attention paid to them will surely fade. The recommendations provided below are primarily based upon the empirical evidence and analysis cited above, as reinforced by the findings of general work on international compliance, monitoring and enforcement. Together this work suggests seven general and 14 more specific practical recommendations for the Canadian government and its Summit partners to pursue to improve Summit compliance in ways that support Canadian foreign policy priorities. These are presented as an extensive array of options, in no order of priority, to provide maximum flexibility in implementing those which the rapidly evolving context of G7 summitry renders most feasible at a particular moment.

Recommendations for Summit Reform

1) Following John Major's suggestions for a more streamlined Summit in 1992,

the Summit agenda should become less overloaded with more intense focus placed on only those issues where the G7 can credibly make a notable difference. Amidst the mass of intractable problems that has inundated the annual Summit agenda in the 1990s, leaders are more able to reach and implement credible cooperative agreements and understandings on policy matters that are genuine products of their own deliberation and value added. It is more difficult for them to monitor and implement concrete strategies to alleviate many problems dealt with by others in the first instance. If leaders continue to attempt to pronounce on the proliferating myriad of issues they are confronted with every year and fail, they risk damaging their reputations and discrediting the summit process. At a minimum, Summit communiques should specify which are the priority areas the leaders have focused on and will focus on, and which are agreements produced elsewhere that they merely endorse.[19]

2) Given the success of compliance in issue areas where finance ministerials have played an integral role, the G7 should hold similar ministerials for foreign ministers both prior to and following the summit. This would enable foreign ministries to focus specifically on pressing *political* matters and offer proposals and suggestions for implementation, monitoring and enforcement on these issues. To ease scheduling difficulties, G7 foreign ministers could meet at seven or eight on the margins of existing multilateral meetings other than the UN, notably NATO (with Japan added) and the OECD. Given the important role of G7 deputies, deputy ministers of foreign affairs could meet to conduct an implementation review.

3) The G7 should internationalize domestic policy issues only when, in the words of Putnam and Paarlberg, a "positive synergistic linkage" can be developed.[20]

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[19] This is not a call for a shorter communique with fewer commitments in general, but for a sharper focus on commitments generated by leaders themselves, and subject to their ongoing attention.

This involves removing from the agenda domestic issues that are not yet "ripe" for implementable resolution as their internationalization may lead to negative synergistic linkages, delaying domestic actions and reform. To meet the understandable desire of leaders to pronounce on late breaking subjects of intense domestic concern - where positive synergistic linkage is not likely - the "Chairman's Summary" should be employed.

4) Summit leaders should focus on policy initiatives whose means-ends relationships are well understood and accepted. They should articulate where possible the means-ends relationships so as to establish their credibility and thus maximize their effects on private agents. Where such relationships are not well understood, they should establish and employ G7 working groups, at times involving nongovernmental experts, to advance the required "science".

5) The G7 should advance commitments in areas where individual leaders and the collective heads of state and government hold both "formal" and real "authority". As explained by Aghion and Tirole, formal authority is the right to decide whereas real authority is effective control over decisions.[21] For example, issues on monetary policy have never been, for all practical purposes, amenable to decisive action by leaders. Leaders often have neither the leading right to decide monetary objectives nor do they exercise control over monetary policy decisions, let alone outcomes. Loss of fast-tract authority by the U.S. President at present would also imply that trade should not be a major part of the Summit agenda for Birmingham (although the need for impetus and

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. [20] See, Putnam, Robert. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games". *International Organization* 2, 1989. pp. 427-460; Paarlberg, Robert. "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkages in a Two-Level Game?" *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1997, pp. 413-44.

[21] Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole, "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations", *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 105, No. 1, 1997, pp. 1-29.

direction for the 1999 WTO ministerial suggests is should be a major item for the German-hosted Summit the following year). Likewise, commitments to be fulfilled by multilateral organizations should occur where the G7 has a high degree of real authority, such as the IMF and OECD, as opposed to being directed at issues in organizations in which the G7 does not possess disproportionate voting rights, such as the United Nations.

6) Related to issues of real and formal authority and principal-agent problems is the credibility of the underlying institutional body that will develop, implement, and carry out policy. Policy dialogue at the Summit level should embrace only those areas where adequate domestic institutional bodies exist, at the federal level, to develop and implement domestic policies. Commitments made by principals whose agents are ill-equipped to carry out the commitment can jeopardize the credibility and effectiveness of the policy announcement. In addition, the institutional body responsible for implementation should be identified, so that the principal-agent relationship is understood. It may be useful, in addition to the publicly issued communique, to have the sherpas prepare a more detailed, private "mandate" or implementation" paper, specifying implementing bodies and, where possible targets, timetables and mid-course adjustment mechanisms.

7) The 1998 Birmingham Summit is currently scheduled to adopt a format first conceived for, but not used at, the first G7 Summit, whereby the leaders will meet completely separately from foreign and finance ministers. The importance of leaders meeting on their own during the Summit gives them greater time to personally understand, become psychologically attached to, and consider implementative implications of, and strategies for, their commitments. However, compliance with

Summit commitments is enhanced by having ministers on site during (or closely linked to) the three-day event, for three important reasons. First, finance and foreign ministers will generally have a clearer understanding of the context and more specific aspects of the economic and political commitments and will thus be able to suggest implementation, monitoring and enforcement strategies. Second, with ministers present on site, or otherwise closely linked to the summit, leaders can immediately instruct them to contribute resources from their respective ministries at the earliest possible stages in the implementation process. And third, ministers can advise heads of state and government immediately of unrealistic commitments and thus prevent them from making commitments that cannot be kept. Thus, in order to enhance compliance under the new leaders format, it is important to devise a strong mechanism to ensure the closest consultation and coordination among heads and foreign and finance ministers, especially in formal or de facto coalition governments (Germany, Italy and Japan), where the ability of the head to command is not assured. It may be useful for heads to consider draft, unpublicized communique passages from the foreign and finance ministers meetings before. Each head should commit to a national post-Summit meeting with ministers immediately afterward. Sherpas, ideally with finance and foreign ministry deputies (where different) should hold a follow-up meeting at seven/eight in the immediate post-Summit period to discuss coordinated implementation.

These seven suggestions for reform provide a guide as to what issues should be on the Summit agenda by explicitly recommending a more streamlined and focused agenda as well as a more coherent and directed communique and appropriate use of the supporting ministerial and sherpa machinery. The final declarations should contain fewer commitments, and ones of higher quality and greater credibility. In this regard,

commitments are more likely to be fulfilled when the means by which they will impact on private agents and ultimate welfare targets are clearly identified. What follows are specific recommendations Canada could take the lead in advancing, to alter the Summit process to improve compliance.

Policy Recommendations for Improving G7 Summit Compliance

1) Canada is well situated within the G7 to encourage the creation and development within their member countries of national G7 secretariats similar to the International Economics Relations Division (EER) which currently exists within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Such domestic secretariats could serve as the depositories for information vital to the monitoring of implementation initiatives. It is important that EER maintain at a minimum, and preferably expand to ensure, the robust resources required, inter alia, to be credible in this task, to lead in the measures indicated below, and to sustain and implement the enhanced array of the minister's initiatives that can be advanced through the Summit system.

2) Given the Canadian government's precedent-setting document released on compliance following the 1995 Halifax Summit, Canada should continue this exercise in years when its not host in regard to its own commitments and encourage its G7 partners to provide similar national progress reports on implementation in the post-Summit period. The OECD staff could be invited to provide technical assistance in this process.

3) The Canadian government, along with other G7 members, should increase awareness concerning Summit issues, particularly given the fact that pressure exerted by public opinion, the media, NGO's, interest groups and the electorate is the usual means for ensuring that governments meet their international commitments. In this

regard, G7 countries should increase the dissemination of information to the public regarding progress achieved on Summit commitments, not only in the lead-up to the Summit and in the period immediately thereafter, but on a year-round basis. The occasion of the G7 foreign ministers meeting at the end of September might be appropriate for conducting a mid-term review that could generate a publication.

4) G7 Summit members should also disseminate privately to their partners information about the progress of other countries in fulfilling their commitments and obligations. This would help to ensure parties that other members are aware of monitoring and are also sharing the burden of implementation, particularly where there are high economic costs associated with complying with certain commitments (ie, C02 emissions reductions). Revealing this type of information would also serve to provide the basis for appropriate international public pressure, initially within the G7. This would assist in encouraging compliance behaviour. Dissemination through the EU to its members could expand the pool of pressure.

5) If Summit success is going to be based on the extent to which leaders follow-up on their Summit commitments, the leaders should ensure that the commitments themselves become more clearly specified so that the quantification and measurement of these commitments becomes less of an arduous exercise and more transparent to all. In cases where numeric targets and timetables are appropriate, leaders should ensure that they are clearly specified, at least in private, allowing for greater consistency in monitoring and implementation across Summit countries.

6) In cases where the communiques have included prescriptions for implementing action, review, monitoring and accountability mechanisms, compliance has proven to be higher. As such, Summit leaders should continue to seek language in

the communique that makes direct reference to such measures. They should also make time at their subsequent Summits to seriously review the results of studies they have commissioned or the reports of bodies they have asked to "report back".

7) Summit leaders should seek to hold important issue-specific G7 ministerials fairly soon after the conclusion of the annual Summits, given that such ministerials are most helpful in ensuring compliance. For example, the timing of the IMF meetings of finance ministers and central bankers, three months following the Summit, is useful in this regard. On the other hand, pre-Summit ministerials, like those of the environment ministers, can help to shape the Summit agenda but may not help ensure compliance.

8) The G7 host country has significant influence over the Summit's agenda and - within limits - on the scope of the commitments achieved. Given the increased attention to Summit compliance following Halifax , this means the host government can, and should, influence whether compliance is scrupulous or slack across the agenda by ensuring that detailed follow-up reports are provided in the post-Summit period and that monitoring of Summit commitments is being effectively executed.

9) Increased institutionalization of the Summit process over the years has contributed to higher compliance levels over time. Leaders should thus work to expand, in functional areas where compliance remains weak, ministerials, working groups and sherpa meetings in order to increase transparency and communication flows among Summit countries. Such mininsterials should be given explicit surveillance and implementation responsibilities. Development and north-south issues join macroeconomic policy and trade as the core agenda that each Summit has addressed, yet they remain alone in not having a stand-alone ministerial forum to oversee implementation. While foreign, finance and environment ministers meet regularly, given

the important role of development assistance issues for the G7, it is important that the heads of the G7 development cooperation agencies meet in order to discuss priorities to improve the quality of ODA and better coordinate adjustments regarding debt consolidations. Given the overall responsibility of the foreign minister for development cooperation in some Summit ministries, such a meeting should involve foreign ministers and form part of an expanded, stand-alone G7 foreign ministers forum. G7 finance ministers might also want to involve ministers responsible for development cooperation on occasion. Progress reports following such meetings should be directed to the heads of state and government as they prepare for the forthcoming Summit.

10) The media can serve as an informal G7 enforcement mechanism ensuring that Summit commitments are lived up to. But in practice they devote little coverage to the record of summit members in complying with the previous year's commitments. National governments should better inform the press of commitments that have been reached in the final communique perhaps by releasing, on a national or collective basis, an inventory of discrete commitments (similar to that prepared for internal use following each Summit). In return, the media would then more readily or robustly monitor implementation measures across G7 countries in the post-Summit period.

11) G7 members should individually announce publicly in the mid-year and immediate pre-Summit period their own compliance record. Such unilateral self-assessment and disclosure could then serve to exert appropriate pressure on other countries to take action.

12) Canada and its G7 Summit partners should mobilize expertise outside of government to encourage feedback and suggestions from other groups on implementation, monitoring and enforcement. In this regard, Canada should encourage

future roundtables (such as the National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy) to inform Canadians about the G7's agenda and priorities. Furthermore, the government should encourage multistakeholder processes in issue-specific areas that would include representatives from business, labour, government, academia, environmental and development groups, aboriginals, and research institutions, to discuss key agenda items for future Summits. There may be merit, given the useful contribution of Canada's SCFAIT in the lead up to Halifax, in forming a G7 Interparliamentary Group which would meet annually and include compliance monitoring as part of its agenda.

13) Canada should promote a collaborative approach to compliance with Summit commitments that would consolidate the efforts of its G7 partners and other international organizations and financial institutions. For example, the WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which annually reviews the Quad countries, could be invited to add a section on Quad member's compliance with G7 trade commitments.

14) The G7 should expand its dialogue with non-member countries when considering the implementation of summit decisions that involve other states, notably India and China (on global warming), Latin America and Africa (on debt and the environment) and Saudi Arabia (on energy).

Conclusion

Since the inception of the G7 Summit, Canada has had a consistently higher record of compliance than other members. There is also good reason to believe that Canada has been able to perform above average on secure Summit commitments that reflect and support its foreign policy interests. It is thus appropriate for Canada (working

in the first instance with Germany and Britain) to take initiatives to further collective G7 mechanisms for strengthening the compliance record of all G7 members, and thus the effectiveness and credibility of the G7 system as a whole.

Canada and its G7 Summit partners should remain committed to implementing Summit commitments for it is in Canada's strong interest for the G7 to remain a credible and effective international forum. Canada is well situated as a partner within the Summit process to advance integrative, consensus-oriented suggestions for compliance enhancement. Reforms that lead to a streamlined and simpler Summit format and narrow the issues discussed to those that meet the criteria suggested in this paper should generate fewer, yet higher quality commitments, which are more likely to be fulfilled. A strengthened role for stand alone ministerials, foreign ministers and other surveillance devices should further improve compliance. Though expectations of the Summit may be somewhat narrowed, it is more likely, given the implementation of these proposals, that the summits would deliver more concrete results.

Appendix A: Methodological Approach to Compliance Measurement and Key Definitions

Key Definitions

Assessing the degree and causes of national compliance with international commitments requires in the first instance a definition and a measurement device for specifying the commitments themselves. The texts of the final communiques since the Summit's inception in 1975 provide a suitable referent for identifying the encoded commitments the Summit has produced.

A "commitment" is defined in this study as a discrete, specific, publicly expressed, collectively agreed statement of intent; a "promise" or "undertaking" by Summit members that they will take future action to move forward, meet, or adjust to an identified target.

"Compliance" with a Summit commitment is defined to mean national government action geared towards the domestic implementation of the necessary formal legislative and administrative regulations and budgetary, institutional or other action designed to execute summit commitments. In other words, compliance is measured according to governmental actions designed to modify existing instruments within the executive and legislative branch to accommodate the commitments reached. By identifying the introduction of new executive actions, an assessment is then made concerning whether or not the domestic political process within the G7 countries are in conformance with the instruments or direction of a target specified in the Summit communique.

Methodological Approach to Compliance Measurement

Assessing compliance so conceived requires isolating and identifying commitments in the communique that are, for the most part, to be found in words rather than numbers. Given the analytical rather than statistical nature of this study, a three-level measurement scale is employed in this paper. This corresponds with the scale constructed by Kokotsis and used by Kokotsis and Kirton. This range includes: 1) full conformance with a commitment (measured by +1); 2) complete failure to implement a commitment (measured by -1); and 3) "work in progress", (measured by "0"), indicating that a resolution has been initiated, but not completed, within the specified time interval (in this case, one full year, from Summit to Summit).

Note that von Furstenberg and Daniels employ a similar metric, but with two notable exceptions. Although the authors consider "+1" to correspond with full conformance, they take "0" to mean failure to implement a commitment and assign a "-1" if the actual outcome is the *opposite* of that committed to.

The analysis in this study employs the Kokotsis-Kirton methodology which is also the methodology employed by the University of Toronto G7 Research Group in their 1996 Lyon compliance study.

Table A

Average (a), Standard Deviation (SD), and Number of Scores (N) for 1975-89 Economic-Summit Undertakings

Score:	Average	SD	N	$(N-1)^{-0.5}$ *
All Undertakings	0.307	0.684	203	0.070
–with 6A Replacing 6.	0.355	0.649	135	0.086
A. By Country, Ordered from Largest, by Size of 1980 GNP				
United States	0.246	0.730	33	0.177
Japan	0.262	0.632	28	0.192
Germany	0.346	0.740	23	0.213
France	0.240	0.612	23	0.213
United Kingdom	0.413	0.743	21	0.224
Italy	0.274	0.688	26	0.200
Canada	0.409	0.603	24	0.209
All Single-Country	0.306	0.685	178	0.075
All Multi-Country	0.314	0.687	25	0.204
B. Detail by Function and Controllability				
1. Real GNP Growth	0.397	0.623	17	0.250
2. Demand Composition	0.233	0.801	7	0.408
3. International Trade	0.734	0.364	7	0.408
4. Fiscal Adjustments	0.259	0.680	40	0.160
5. Interest Rate	0.221	0.526	20	0.229
6. Inflation Rate	0.221	0.731	80	0.113
6A. –Multi-Country Scoring	0.266	0.672	12	0.302
7. Foreign Exchange Rate	-0.700	0.301	2	1
8. Aid and Schedules	0.265	0.388	5	0.5
9. Energy	0.660	0.559	25	0.204
Direct Policy Measures	0.279	0.617	10	0.333
All Others	0.309	0.688	193	0.072
All Except Energy	0.258	0.686	178	0.075
All Except Inflation	0.364	0.646	123	0.091

Source: Scores for the first 15 summits calculated by the authors.
* This is the standard deviation (SD) of the average score under the joint null hypothesis that the population value of the SD of scores is 1.

TABLE B

SUMMARY: Comparison of US vs. Canadian compliance with all examined commitments resulting from G7 summits held between 1988 - 1995:

Col #:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
	Biodiversity			Climate Change			Debt			Assistance to Russia			Summary		
Year	Total number of b'diversity commit-ments mutually agreed upon by both Countries:	Net Level of compliance by Canada:	Net Level of compliance by the United States:	Total number of climate change commit-ments mutually agreed upon by both Countries:	Net Level of compliance by Canada:	Net Level of compliance by the United States:	Total number of debt commit-ments mutually agreed upon by both Countries:	Net Level of compliance by Canada:	Net Level of compliance by the United States:	Total number of debt commit-ments mutually agreed upon by both Countries:	Net Level of compliance by Canada:	Net Level of compliance by the United States:	Total number of all commit-ments mutually agreed upon by both Countries: (Sum of Columns 1,4 ,7 & 10)	Net Level of compliance by Canada: (Sum of Columns 2,5,8 & 11)	Net Level of compliance by the United States: (Sum of Columns 3,6,9 & 12)
1988	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	2	-2	--	--	--	2	2	-2
1989	0	0	0	4	0	-4	1	1	0	--	--	--	5	1	-4
1990	6	-5	-3	7	-1	-1	3	3	3	2	2	2	18	-1	1
1991	2	1	-1	5	1	-1	2	2	2	2	0	2	11	4	2
1992	3	2	2	7	6	3	2	2	0	5	5	5	17	15	10
1993	1	0	-1	4	4	2	1	1	1	6	4	6	12	9	8
1994	1	1	-1	4	4	4	1	1	1	3	1	3	9	7	7
1995	2	2	-1	3	3	3	1	1	1	3	1	3	9	7	6
Total	15	1	-5	34	17	6	13	13	6	21	13	21	83	44	28

Table C: 1996 Lyon Summit Compliance Scores

Issue Area	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	United States	United Kingdom	Average Score
Economic Issues								
Macroeconomics	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
Microeconomics	1	0	1	n/a	-1	0	1	0.29
Trade	0	0	0	n/a	0	1	1	0.29
Development	0	0	0	n/a	0	0	0	0.00
IFI Reform	-1	n/a	0	n/a	1	1	1	0.29
UN Reform I ($ obligations)	1	0	1	0	0	0	-1	0.14
UN Reform II (dev't agenda)	1	0	1	0	0	0	-1	0.14
Transnational Issues								
Terrorism	1	1	1	n/a	1	1	0	0.71
Human Rights	1	1	1	n/a	0	1	1	0.71
Nuclear Safety	1	1	1	0	0	-1	0	0.29
Environment	0	0	1	0	-1	0	1	0.14
Global Information Society	1	0	0	n/a	1	1	1	0.57
Crime	0	0	1	n/a	1	0	1	0.43
Security Issues								
Arms Control	1	0	1	n/a	0	-1	1	0.29
Proliferation (Land Mines)	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.71
East/West Relations	1	1	1	n/a	1	1	1	0.86
Middle East	-1	-1	-1	n/a	0	1	-1	-0.43
Asia	-1	-1	-1	n/a	0	1	-1	-0.43
Conflict in Europe	1	1	1	1	n/a	1	1	0.86
Total	9	5	11	3	4	8	8	6.86
Average Score	0.47	0.26	0.58	0.16	0.21	0.42	0.42	0.36

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